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Russo-Georgian war as a signal of balance of power shift?
That is the arguement of this fascinating article by George Friedman. The article is, by far, the most compelling and realistic (using both the regular and international relations definitions) description of the war, its causes, and its strategic and political ramifications for international relations. Here are a few blurbs:
“The Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance of power in the region. They welcomed the opportunity to drive home the new reality, which was that they could invade Georgia and the United States and Europe could not respond.”
…
“In other words, the Russians have backed the Americans into a corner. The Europeans, who for the most part lack expeditionary militaries and are dependent upon Russian energy exports, have even fewer options. If nothing else happens, the Russians will have demonstrated that they have resumed their role as a regional power. Russia is not a global power by any means, but a significant regional power with lots of nuclear weapons and an economy that isn’t all too shabby at the moment. It has also compelled every state on the Russian periphery to re-evaluate its position relative to Moscow. . . .
The war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia’s public return to great power status. This is not something that just happened — it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power, and with growing intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with the increase of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that the Middle Eastern wars have left the United States off-balance and short on resources. As we have written, this conflict created a window of opportunity. The Russian goal is to use that window to assert a new reality throughout the region while the Americans are tied down elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The war was far from a surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical foundations of the war have been building since 1992.”
How Obama did it
Today’s Washington Post has a fascinating article that details the Obama campaign’s strategy throughout the primary process. The focus on small caucus states appears to have two causes: first, the campaign sought to compete where Clinton was weakest; second, the campaign focused on exploiting the electoral rules to grab every spare delegate. The former reason motivated the campaign to send volunteers and staffers to small, solidly Republican states like Alaska and Kansas, where the campaign could beat the Clinton machine for the hearts of those voters, many of whom rarely get a chance to play a role in Democratic Party presidential politics. The latter reason caused the campaign to zero-in on the different delegate formulas. For example, the story explains that Obama won more pledged delegates from Nevada than did Clinton, even though she won the vote in the state, because his support was concentrated in districts in which an odd-number delegates could be given. The strategy certainly paid off, although just barely. Another factor that the article does not mention is the psychological role of winning primary (or caucus) after primary. Obama rattled off a string of 10 primary and caucus victories after Super Tuesday; the news coverage produced by that string, even though some (Utah and Nebraska) of those states were small, heavily-Republican states, was incredibly important to convince super delegates and voters that Obama was winning the nomination. This undoubtedly helped his candidacy’s viability and his own electability image.
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